



**"Reality or Wishful Thinking  
- Does the Cotonou Process Strengthen Civil Society?"**

**Documentation of the Workshop**

**on 29<sup>th</sup> July**

**in Bonn**

**VENRO**

**Working Paper No. 13**

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VENRO is a voluntary association of around 100 German non-governmental organisations (NGOs), most of which operate at national level. Local initiatives are represented by VENRO via the NGO regional networks, which are also VENRO members.

The VENRO members are private and church-oriented agencies of development cooperation, emergency relief and development education, public relations and lobbying activities.

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## Introduction

Anke Kurat, VENRO e. V.

The Cotonou Agreement was signed by 77 ACP states and the European Union and came into force early in April 2003. In contrast to the Lomé Agreement of the past, the most important new element regarding the area of development cooperation between the EU and the ACP states is that the consideration of civil society actors is contractually established in the new agreement.

The Cotonou Process offers considerable opportunities for development NGOs in the South. For example, the Cotonou Agreement enables direct access for Southern NGOs to the 9<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF). Up to 15 per cent of the funds for a respective country can be used by civil society organisations.

Under the heading **“Reality or Wishful Thinking – Does the Cotonou Process Strengthen Civil Society?”**, the workshop is to provide a framework for a critical assessment of the degree to which the Cotonou Process really has involved civil society so far. Additionally, the event is intended to demonstrate the options and perspectives of the NGOs in the South. To this end, representatives of Brussels-based NGO networks, VENRO member organisations, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the Committee for Economic Cooperation and Development of the German Parliament (AwZ), the EU Commission, the ACP Secretariat, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and an NGO representative from Tanzania have been invited.

The workshop addresses both NGO staff in the country and policy departments as well as political decision-makers. Owing to the participation of international guests, the event is to be held in English.



# Welcome and Opening of the VENRO Workshop

**Elke Rusteberg, Kindernothilfe e. V.**

Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues!

On behalf of VENRO, I would like to welcome you today to our workshop on the Cotonou Agreement. A special welcome goes to the participants from the Czech and Slovak Republics and Malta, who have been invited to a week in Germany by VENRO through the TRIALOG programme. Another special welcome goes to Rebecca Muna from the Tanzania Gender Resource Centre, and to Pieter Bangma from the European Commission, who has made every effort to be able to participate. Thank you all for coming and for your interest in the issue of EC-ACP cooperation.

The title of our workshop "Reality or Wishful Thinking - Does the Cotonou Process Strengthen Civil Society" seems self-explanatory. However, I would like to add some remarks about our motives and expectations with regard to this workshop.

First of all, we feel that there is a need for information and awareness raising about the Agreement in VENRO member organisations. The people on the ground who deal with project work on the operational level every day sometimes find it difficult to assess why the Cotonou Agreement is relevant for them and their partners, and why participation of civil society is so important. That is why we will have an introductory session which deals with the chances and possibilities for partner organisations in the South in the framework of the Cotonou Agreement. This will also be reflected when set against the background of the current developments within the European Commission system, including the process of decentralisation, i.e. the shifting of competence to European Commission delegations.

The second purpose is to critically assess the reality and status of implementation of the objectives and intentions of the Cotonou Agreement. As Commissioner Poul Nielsen stated in his presentation of the new agreement, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement

“will give a new momentum to the relationship between the ACP States and the European Union. [...] The new agreement marks a turning point in at least three key aspects: the objectives to be focused on, the ways and means to achieve them, and the nature of the partnership. [...] Dialogue plays a key role in the success of development cooperation activities. It is at the heart of the relationship between the ACP group and the EU. [...] The association of civil society and the promotion of a more direct involvement of all stakeholders are also major components which doubtless will contribute to the success of the partnership.” (BMZ Materialien Nr. 118, S. 14/15).

To what extent will these well-meaning declarations bear up against the empirical evidences? We will hear about the status of implementation and the quality of civil society participation from the northern and southern perspectives.

In the final session, a panel discussion with political decision-makers will deal with some of the major concerns of the civil society actors, which relate to the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement, trying to arrive at specific recommendations.



## **Session I:**

# **The Significance of the Cotonou Agreement for Development NGOs**

## **Civil Society in the Cotonou Agreement**

**Simon Stocker, Eurostep**

### **Introduction**

The purpose of this presentation is to explore the opportunities that the Cotonou Agreement offers for civil society to participate in EU-ACP cooperation, and the challenges that we are faced with in order to make these reality.

I want to begin by providing basic information about the Cotonou Agreement. I have no doubt that many of you will already know much about the Agreement and its provisions, but it is important to place the issue of participation in the overall context of the EU-ACP cooperation framework.

Then, I will focus on Cotonou's provisions, the opportunities and the limitations, for the participation of civil society and other non-state actors.

Finally I will explore the context in which the Cotonou Agreement is being implemented, and the potential risks to the Agreement itself. The Cotonou Agreement is certainly central to the EU's development cooperation policies, but there are many processes taking place within the EU that could radically change the framework for EU development policy. This could have major implications for the EU's relations with ACP countries.

The Cotonou Agreement is a partnership agreement between the 15 countries of the European Union, and 79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, 40 of them are classified as Least Developed (out of the 48 LDCs). When the 10 accession countries join the EU in May 2004, they will also be bound by the Agreement as it is part of the *acquis communautaire*. Its origin goes back to the beginning of the Union itself and has been built on the former relations between EU member states and their colonies in the three regions. The agreement covers the period 2000 to 2020, with provision for reviews of the agreement every five years.

The Cotonou Agreement is at the centre of the EU's development cooperation policy, and is arguably the best agreement of its kind in the world. As a framework that defines the cooperation between the EU and ACP states it embodies the concepts of partnership and ownership that is so often stressed as being crucial to viable development.

The partnership agreement is comprehensive, not only covering the EU's aid, but also other aspects of cooperation, particularly trade. The ACP countries have enjoyed a level of trade preference with the EU through successive agreements, although one of the key differences between the Cotonou Agreement and Lomé Conventions that preceded it is the phasing out of the old preference regime and its replacement by new trade agreements that the EU is proposing be based on Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and sub regions of the ACP.

The financing of the agreement is through the European Development Fund, an intergovernmental agreement between the member states of the EU. As such it is separated from the annual budget of the Union, and therefore does not come under the jurisdiction of

the European Parliament. This is the principal reason behind the longstanding position of the Parliament for the EDF to be budgetised.

The ninth EDF provides €13.5 billion for the first five years of the Cotonou Agreement (2000 to 2005). The aim is for this to be actually spent over the period leading up to 2007. According to the European Commission the total amount available for this period will be €25 billion, taking into account the unspent resources from previous funds set up to finance the Lomé Convention.

The objectives of the Cotonou Agreement are:

- To promote economic, cultural and social development with a view to contributing to peace and security, and to promote a stable and democratic political environment.
- The reduction and eventual eradication of poverty.
- The integration of ACP countries into the world economy; and
- To foster sustainable development.

The implementation of the Agreement involves a number of institutions. The nature of partnership is reflected through:

- The Joint Council of Ministers that meets at least annually;
- The Committee of Ambassadors that comprises representation of the EU member states and ACP countries through their Ambassadors accredited to the EU;
- A Joint Parliamentary Assembly consisting of Parliamentary representatives from each of the 79 ACP states with an equivalent number of MEPs. The Assembly meets twice a year, once in Europe and once in an ACP country.

The European Commission is the EU's executing body for its cooperation with the ACP, with DG Development being responsible for managing the relationship.

The ACP has a Brussels-based secretariat that supports its members' engagement in the partnership agreement, but it should not be seen as an ACP equivalent to the European Commission. It has comparatively little delegated responsibility and for the most part is financially dependent on funding from the Commission.

An EU-ACP Economic and Social Committee has a role in bringing together social actors from both sides of the agreement, including trade unions and trade associations.

It is in this framework that the participation of civil society is set. The articles providing for the involvement of civil society and other non-state actors was one of the important innovations of the Cotonou Agreement. It legitimises their participation by formally recognising the important role that they play in fostering ownership of society in the development process. While they are not formal partners to the agreement itself, the articles make their involvement in all aspects of the Cotonou process a requirement of the cooperation between the EU and ACP. This includes political dialogue, planning and implementation.

The articles on participation apply to all non-state actors, a concept that has been established within the cooperation framework of the European Union. In article 6 of the Agreement non-state actors are defined as:

- The private sector
- Economic and social partners
- Civil society in all its forms according to national characteristics.

Article 7 of the Agreement identifies the need for capacity building of non-state actors for them to be able to effectively participate. It states:

*“The contribution of civil society to development can be enhanced by strengthening community organisations and non-governmental organisations in all spheres of co-operation. This will require:*

- *Encouraging and supporting the creation and development of such organisations;*
- *Establishing arrangements for involving such organisations in the design, implementation and evaluation of development strategies and programmes.”*

The agreement also defines the conditions that are necessary for involving non-state actors (article 4). It states that they:

- *“be informed and involved in consultations on cooperation policies and strategies, on priorities for cooperation...”*
- *“be provided with financial resources...”*
- *“be involved in the implementation of cooperation projects and programmes...”*
- *“be provided with capacity building support.”*

However, almost all the relevant articles also contain qualifications about the actors that are to be involved. These provide ample opportunity for ACP governments to make their own choices about who should participate.

So what are the experiences to date of the participation of civil society and other non-state actors in the EU’s cooperation with ACP countries within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement? Since there will be detailed presentations later on in the seminar on different experiences I will only outline a few areas in which such participation would be expected if the requirements of the Agreement were being fully implemented:

- Regional preparation meetings for the programming process. These were the first sets of meetings after the Agreement was signed in which non-state actors could be expected to be involved. Their participation was indicated as an expectation, with the ACP governments being left with the responsibility to identify and invite relevant non-state actors. A *Eurostep* study of the reports from one of these meetings concluded that the inclusion of civil society actors in these meetings had been partial, with the involvement of very few women.<sup>1</sup>
- Country Support Strategies and National Indicative Programmes. These are central to the EU’s cooperation exercise, and it is where the involvement of civil society and other non-

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<sup>1</sup> *The Cotonou Agreement: A gateway for civil society engagement in development co-operation?* By Guggi Laryea published in Social Watch Annual Report 2001, [http://www.socialwatch.org/en/informelmpreso/pdfs/cotonoucivilsoc2001\\_eng.pdf](http://www.socialwatch.org/en/informelmpreso/pdfs/cotonoucivilsoc2001_eng.pdf)

state actors is most crucial. Many different studies have been done in ACP countries, some of which will be presented in detail later in the meeting. The Commission has done a statistical study that quantifies the number of CSS processes that involved non-state actors, and how many were changed as a result of their comments. These show a relatively high level of involvement. However, the statistics from the Commission's assessment tends to be quantitative, and says little about the quality of the involvement. *Eurostep* worked with local civil society organisations in five ACP countries to assess the process of participation in those countries.<sup>2</sup> Our emphasis was more on the perceptions of civil society on the process of involvement. While there were predictable differences the overall conclusions from these studies indicated that:

- The trade negotiations between the EU and the ACP to establish new trade arrangements that will be effective from 2008 are a crucial aspect of the ACP's relationship with the EU. While the Commission has sought to engage European NGOs and other actors in a dialogue on the EPA negotiations as part of their overall civil society trade dialogue, there is little evidence that there has been any real attempt to involve civil society from the ACP.
- The next stage in the programming process will be the mid-term reviews of the National Indicative programmes, and this will be a further test of the level of commitment to a real process of engagement. Preparations for the mid-term reviews are already taking place, with the reviews taking place throughout 2004.
- As part of the commitment to involving civil society in the political dialogue, a civil dialogue has been established as part of the annual meeting of the Joint Council of Ministers. The first effective civil dialogue took place in May. This is a welcome initiative not so much because it provides an opportunity for real dialogue. This is difficult when the session only lasts one hour and there are more than 110 people round a table, but it is a symbol of the engagement. However, a dialogue at the level of the Joint Council should not replace the dialogue at national level, where the action should really be taking place.

Finally, the twice-yearly sessions of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly are also to provide opportunities for civil society to engage in the political dialogue of the Agreement. This was already happening under the Lomé Convention, with the provision of recognised civil society representation from both the EU and the ACP – in addition to the accepted role of the ACP-EU Economic and Social Committee.

It is recognised that while the articles in the Cotonou Agreement provide the basis for non-state actor participation there is a need for greater definition to be given to the process and procedures for this to happen. In the Commission DG Development is working to bring greater clarity to this process, and a Communication was drafted in the Directorate, which was eventually adopted by the Commission. The difficulties that the Communication went through before it finally emerged gives an indication of the differences that exist in the Commission on involving civil society and other non-state actors. The end result is more of a collection of experiences than a blueprint for a participatory process. Indeed it can be said that what is already set out in the Cotonou Agreement is more advanced than the conclusions in the Communication. The main outcome of the Communication was a commitment to producing guidelines for delegations in their management of non-state actors.

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<sup>2</sup> Reports from Benin, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Tanzania and Uganda can be found at <http://www.eurostep.org/pubs/position/acp-eu-cotonou/index.html>

In the context of the Cotonou Agreement the Joint Council of Ministers adopted a set of Eligibility Criteria at their meeting in May. The purpose of this is to define the criteria that need to be met for civil society organisations to have access to funds from the national indicative programme. Included in these are ...

The strengthened role for non-state actors not only make demands on the ACP states to involve them, but also has implications for the way in which civil society organisations relate to the state and other official structures. While the Cotonou Agreement defines the framework for EU-ACP cooperation, this cooperation is for the most part worked out bilaterally between the EU and individual ACP states.

The Agreement makes provision for the funding of local civil society organisations and other non-state actors, which from the perspective of the EU is part of its overall approach to reduce the role of central government. This is entirely consistent with the aim of privatising services and activities that have so far been provided by government.

The strengthening and capacity building of non-state actors is part of this strategy, which is primarily aimed at building capacity outside of government in the provision of services. The qualifications for the involvement of civil society and other non-state actors that are set out in the Cotonou Agreement are partly geared to help restrict participants to what are considered relevant players for the development strategies that the government and EU wish to pursue.

In the process this also challenges European NGOs and their role in the process. As the Commission moves to a more decentralised approach in making decisions, and gives increased opportunities for local organisations in developing countries to directly access Community Funds, not only does this question the role of European NGOs as intermediaries for channelling funds to local organisations, but potentially requires a stronger presence in developing countries so as to maintain an adequate relationship with the Commission delegation. This is a process of ongoing reflection that demands greater clarity about the respective roles of NGOs in Europe and in ACP countries, which should lead to stronger partnerships between the two. At the same time, the ability of ACP civil society organisations and other non-state actors to get direct financial support from the European Community will demand its own reflection. Funding comes with strings of one sort or another that have implications for the recipient organisations.

These opportunities for civil society to engage in the EU's cooperation with ACP countries needs to be put in the context of a number of other ongoing processes that affect the EU's development policy framework, and its relations with the ACP.

The Reform of the Commission's external services has already high-lighted the differences in the EU's approaches to different regions of the developing world. The relationship with the ACP is currently clearly rooted in a development policy that has a focus on poverty as the principal objective. DG Development, which is tasked with responsibility for the EU's development policy, manages relations with the ACP.

Relations with Asia and Latin America, however, are set within the External Relations policy framework, and are managed by DG for External Relations. While EU Development Policy objectives are supposed to apply to all developing countries, the EU's relations with countries in Asia and Latin America are primarily governed by other external relations policies.

The reform process also separated development policy from implementation, first through establishing the Common Service, and subsequently the creation of Europe Aid. This not only leads to a weakening of the relationship between policy and practice, but also has led to a significantly smaller Directorate for Development.

The current process of deconcentration, whereby decision making is more decentralised to the delegations, also plays its part in this process. In many ways decentralisation makes much sense, but may lead to a further weakening of the policy framework as policies start to be defined within the delegations themselves. This is quite likely, given the weak capacity in the Commission in Brussels for policy development. This could be compounded if DG Development were to be abolished, as is being widely predicted. Clearly it depends on where the existing functions of DG Development are placed within the Commission structures.

There have also been changes in the Council that affect the way in which development issues are treated. The abolition of the Development Council in 2002 removed the official forum in which the Member States' Ministers responsible for development cooperation met on a regular basis, not only to take decisions about the EU's development policies, but also to have informal discussions. The amalgamation of the Development Council within the new General Affairs and External Relations Council will inevitably undermine the role of Development Ministers within Member States. The first attempt at a "Development Cluster" in November 2002 was an acknowledged fiasco, as Ministers moved in and out of the meeting depending on the issue being considered. The lack of a dedicated Council forum for taking decisions on development issues will certainly lead to many countries not feeling the need for the "Development Minister" to be present.

The option to continue with an informal meeting of Development Ministers is seen by some as the way to maintain an ongoing forum for Development Ministers to meet. However, not only will these meetings not have the power of mandate to take formal decisions, but their scheduling depends on the will of the Presidency country to provide space, time and resources to make them work. There is also less pressure on Ministers to attend, potentially leading to a process in which countries with a commitment to development cooperation participating, with others staying away. The common approach to an EU development cooperation policy will be weakened in the process.

This paves the way for development cooperation to become increasingly subordinate to other policies of the EU, particularly those concerning external political, trade and security issues. Development policy that has been built over the past decade will increasingly become rhetorical, as Europe's own internally driven interests define all aspects of external policy.

For while development policy has become clearly more focused on tackling poverty, the pressures to assert other interests are also increasing. The process of enlargement is both demanding and costly. The reluctance of the existing 15 Member States to increase contributions to the European Union budget will result in other parts of the budget being squeezed.

In addition, the new Member States will bring different approaches and values to development cooperation. Their aspiration for membership is to increase the economic benefits accruing to their own countries, and their approaches to development cooperation will have this in mind.

New priorities for the Member States of the EU are also affecting development cooperation. While one can argue that the war against terrorism only emphasises the need for a development programme that is effective in tackling poverty, the actual emphasis is put elsewhere. Preventing the migration of people into the EU has also become a political priority for which development funds are being increasingly utilised. These, and other actions motivated by the EU's internal interests are increasing. With the moves towards establishing more effective common external political and security policies, and the desire to promote the EU's goods and services around the world, the resources in development budgets are seen as assets to be used to achieve the objectives of these policies.

The process of establishing a European Constitution was motivated by enlargement to make the EU of 25 states manageable. However, the outcome of this process will lay the legal base for the future role of the EU in the world.

The Convention's proposals for the constitution already demonstrate how these issues are being integrated into the future EU framework. It was inevitable that foreign political and defence policies would be central to defining the EU's role in the world. It is recognised that if the EU is to become a global player politically, and not just economically, then the EU's common foreign and security policy needs strengthening. However, there are considerable differences within the EU on how this should be done.

The Convention was an innovation to prepare the IGC, which opened up the process as never before. But many of the proposals being made for the European Constitution, taken together with other changes taking place, seem to threaten the viability of the Cotonou Agreement.

Regarding the current negotiations for future trade arrangements between the EU and regions as ACP states, the ACP have been seeking an initial stage in the EPA negotiations in which a commitment could be reached between the EU and ACP group as a whole, setting out common approaches to the EPAs. So far the EU has refused to reach any committed agreement during the first stage. As the regional negotiations start in September 2003 there is concern that divisions in the ACP following the start of the regional negotiations could threaten the integrity of the ACP group.

Proposals for budgetisation of the EDF have been consistently put forward for a long time. The principles of budgetisation should be supported. It would bring control of this part of the EC's programme under the European Parliament – which is not currently the case with the EDF remaining an inter-governmental agreement. However, under the present circumstances and trends it would also add pressure on the ACP's integrity. The role of ACP governments would be reduced, with an increase in the flexibility for the Commission in the use of the funding. It is argued that this is a necessary step to make more effective use of the existing resources, so much of which remains unspent. However, it opens the possibility for using these funds for other urgent priorities outside the ACP regions, such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

If this is set within the context of the EU's policy approaches to different parts of the developing world, it is clear that for the time being EU development policy is seen as being applicable only to ACP countries. The Commission's proposals for an Activity Based Budget for 2004 demonstrates this clearly, with the ACP budget falling under the Development Title and with those for other developing regions being placed in the External Relations Title, along with the CFSDP. It is clearly the view of the Commission that the policy framework for Asia and Latin America is the EU's political foreign policy and not development.

The Commission is also proposing a rationalisation of thematic budget lines (which under the Commission's proposals for 2004 fall under the Development Title), including the integration of some of them into the geographical lines. So far the Commission's proposals for rationalisation have been largely justified on administrative grounds, but also with an emphasis on introducing greater flexibility for the Commission's management of its funds. It would certainly impact on policy too.

Finally, there is also a move towards the creation of "Global Funds" - such as on HIV/AIDS, water - which have some advantages for the Commission's management of its aid. First, it would enable a more rapid disbursement of funds - at least from the EC's accounts, although not necessarily in actual expenditure for actions on the ground. Secondly, it would be another mechanism for increasing the flexibility for the Commission.

In conclusion, the Cotonou Agreement is an innovative cooperation agreement that incorporates many opportunities for fostering real participation of civil society actors. The legitimisation that the Agreement gives to the role of non-state actors needs to be built upon. First and foremost, this needs to be done nationally, but within a recognised framework defined by the overall cooperation between the EU and ACP countries. This should certainly open new possibilities for ACP civil society organisations to work with the official partners to the Agreement, but it also calls for a strengthened independent partnership between ACP and EU civil society.

These innovations are set within the context of the EU's cooperation with the ACP, but we should be seeking its extension to other developing countries.

Participation of civil society in the process to produce Country Strategy Papers was certainly less than adequate. However, there was progress and this needs to be built upon during the mid-term reviews of the CSPs, as they take place in 2004. These will be a test of the actual commitment by the EU and ACP governments to strengthen the involvement of non-state actors.

At the same time, these provisions need to be implemented in the process to negotiate new trade agreements between the EU and ACP countries. These negotiations will be fundamental to the future of EU-ACP cooperation.

Furthermore, we need to be aware of the changes taking place that will affect the whole of the EU's development policy framework, including the Cotonou Agreement. The Agreement may be a model for a development cooperation partnership, but we must be careful to ensure that the EU's development policies have a real and identifiable role with sufficient independence from other EU policy interests. Otherwise we may find ourselves working to increase civil society participation within a cooperation framework that is effectively being dismantled.

## Session I: The Significance of the Cotonou Agreement for Development NGOs

### What Do They Have in Common, How Do They Differ – A “Parallel Look” at the PRSPs and the Cotonou CSP/NIPs

Peter Lanzet, EED

The following contribution tables juxtapose the poverty reduction approaches currently undertaken by the International Financial Institutions World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with the support of their member countries as well as the European Union’s Commission, Council and Parliament. The comparison is done at the level of prevailing approaches, policies, finances, institutions etc.

Inception/History of the Programmes	
PRSP	Cotonou CSP/NIP
<p>The World Bank’s and International Monetary Fund’s “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers”- approach (PRSP) was conceived by these institutions in order to accelerate the struggle against poverty and take steps to co-ordinate the heterogeneous donor interests and activities in developing countries. The inception coincides with the growing rejection by Civil Society (SC) and Governments of the “Washington Consensus” liberalisation policies applied by the WB/IMF in the context of the provision of stabilisation and development loans to developing countries. Increasingly, they were seen as poverty creating rather than reducing. Something had to be done.</p> <p>An opportunity arose when the G 7 meeting in Cologne connected debt cancellation with poverty reduction. At that point, the elaboration of an overall national anti-poverty plan, capable of including debt service proceeds and all other finances, both state revenue, export earnings, workers' remittances as well as external support in the form of aid, loans or foreign direct investment, were deemed necessary by the</p>	<p>Stifling bureaucracy and political “laissez faire” had achieved very modest success during the 4 preceding Lomé Treaties that had been implemented since the 60s.</p> <p>EU trade with African LDC’s had decreased from 6,7% in 1976 to barely 3% in 1998. Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law had not improved. The Transformation Countries became politically and financially more important than ACP countries. In 1998 for the first time the Transformation Countries received more grants than the countries of the ACP-cooperation (€2.506 bn / €1.952 bn). Based on the evaluation of the Lomé Treaties (Green Book, 1996) a new treaty, the ACP/EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement, was conceived. For the current (?) cooperation between one of the 79 ACP countries and the EU, a “Country Strategy Programme as well as a National Indicative Programme” (CSP/NIP) became the guiding documents.</p> <p>The Cotonou agreement, as it became known after its signing on 23/6/2000 in Cotonou, Benin, introduced selectivity: Countries, which</p>

<p>donors. The PRSP were to reflect national objectives, targets and an overall finance plan for halving poverty by 2015. They were meant to be the policy reference text for the coordination of all types of ODA-based support, bi- and multilateral.</p> <p>Thereby the PRSP were to pursue a Pro-Poor Policy, combining the search for a poverty-oriented macro-economic reform with a more direct poverty-reducing social and development policy. The PRSP were meant to be worked out in ownership and under the control of the relevant Governmental actors of each developing country and made Civil Society (CS) consultation before the finalisation of the text mandatory.</p>	<p>govern justly, fight corruption, consult Civil Society and whose projects work, would receive aid preference. It introduced a political dialogue with a mandate to take up cases of corruption, which in extreme cases could lead to the suspension of cooperation - as e.g. presently happening with Zimbabwe. Cotonou clearly defines certain cooperation priorities, such as macro-economic support, infrastructure and social sector development as well as tourism. Based on these priorities the specific national situation was to be captured in a Country Strategy Plan coupled with an annual National Indicative Programme.</p> <p>The role of the participation of Civil Society (CS) in planning and implementing development programmes was improved compared with the previous agreements. At the LLDC Conference in Brussels in 2001 the EU even specified that up to 15% of the total aid finances of a national envelope could be utilised by CS Organisations for their Poverty Reduction Programmes. The EU also clarified that the ACP/EU-cooperation policies, priorities and finances (i.e. the CSP/NIP) should form part of the overall PRSP of a country.</p>
<p><b>Both approaches:</b></p>	
<p>Both approaches refer to poverty reduction as central objectives of their cooperation. They are committed to the principles of the Monterrey Consensus and are understood as important instruments of reaching the Millennium Development Goals. They believe in the predominant role of domestic economic growth to be achieved through macro-economic stability, direct foreign investment, increased export and progressive integration into the global economy as the most important means to overcome poverty and to achieve sustainable development.</p> <p>The PRSPs as well as the Cotonou CSP/NIPs underline the role of Good Governance, the rule of law and efficient administration as well as an independent, efficient judiciary. In general, they share the same definition of Civil Society, i.e. occupational associations, unions, grassroots organisations, non-government development organisations or the private sector. However, Cotonou includes Local Government in CS. Both approaches see a legitimate role of CS as an actor in national policy - a level of legitimacy CS did not enjoy with their national Governments before.</p>	

<b>Countries and Finances</b>	
<b>PRSP</b>	<b>Cotonou CSP/NIP</b>
More than 60 countries have prepared an Interim or a full PRSP before asking the multilateral and bilateral donors for the reduction of debts under the Highly Indebted Poorest Countries Initiative (HIPC), the extension of concessional IDA loans, IWF stabilisation lending or bilateral aid. In principle, the total of \$ 56 bn in annual aid would be provided within the PRSP's frameworks.	66 ACP countries have signed a CSP/NIP with the EU. All 15 EU member countries have ratified the Cotonou Agreement with the 79 ACP member countries. The Cotonou Agreement and unspent funds from previous Lomé treaties enable a total of aid finances of €25 bn.
<b>Actors, Processes, and Institutions</b>	
<b>PRSP</b>	<b>Cotonou CSP/NIP</b>
National Governments analyse poverty data in the country, organise broad-based consultations of all sections of society, then finalise the PRSP. Often it is Vice President's offices, Finance or Home or Foreign Affairs Ministers, giving a lead to national strategy formation. The WB/IWF scrutinise a national PRSP and prepare a "Joint Staff Assessment" for the discussion of their boards and for decision making on e.g. debt reduction, IDA or PRGF loans. In the case of the countries that are part of the HIPC initiative, the staffs also assess if a country can achieve and possibly maintain a sustainable debt level after debt reduction. If debt services in this context are actually rededicated to the implementation of programmes under the PRSP, they are either used within the national budget, as in the case of Bolivia, or set aside in special funds for utilisation under the Government in cooperation with Civil Society network representations, as in Uganda or Cameroon.	The National Authorisation Officer (NAO) and the EU Delegate draw up the CSP/NIP together and consult CS in the process. The EU Development Directorate and Europe Aid scrutinise it. They involve all 15 EU members by way of the EU Council. The financial envelope of a particular country is a share of the European Development Fund, a fund of the member states, separate of the EU Commission Funds for Development (Chapter 4 funds). After scrutiny and negotiations the head of the ACP state and the EU Development Commissioner sign it. Unlike the PRSPs, the Cotonou cooperation has an institutional structure. Once a year the Council of Ministers meets. It is composed of representatives of all ACP states, all EU Council representatives and the EU Commission on Development. The Council of Ministers resolves questions and disputes and in particular conducts the "Political Dialogue". To prepare its meetings and carry out its resolutions, the "Committee of Ambassadors" meets regularly, consisting of all ACP ambassadors accredited with the EU, the EU-ACP delegate and the EU Commission. These political and working bodies are consulted by biannual meetings of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, bringing together EU and ACP Parliamentarians in equal numbers.

<b>Trade, Direct Investment and Exports</b>	
<p>PRSP does not provide a common framework for trade. However, trade and particularly exports are seen as most the important revenue earners in addition to domestic savings, direct foreign investment and the transfer of workers.</p> <p>WTO regulations apply for WTO members. In the case of developing countries, different waivers and privileges protect them from reciprocal free trade. But waivers are time-bound, in the case of the EU-Cotonou trade cooperation they last until 2008, and for some Least Developed Countries even longer. Based on the WTO rules and exceptions countries also maintain many bilateral trade agreements. In the context of the “Doha Development Round” trade negotiations, developing countries and CS work towards protective and preferential trade policies.</p>	<p>Due to the “Everything but Arms” initiative, the EU imports from the 41 least developed among the 79 ACP countries are 93% quota- and duty-free.</p> <p>After 2008 the WTO waiver will end. The EU is planning to substitute the present trade arrangements by Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) as part of the Cotonou Agreement. For LDCs, non-reciprocal trade relations carry on.</p>
<b>Conditionality</b>	
<b>PRSP</b>	<b>Cotonou CSP/NIP</b>
<p>Conditions are attached to the provision of loans from IMF’s Poverty Reduction Growth Fund (PRGF). PRGF is the new name for the notorious Structural Adjustment Loans. More than 40 PRGFs have been agreed upon so far, with more than half of them without the now prescribed Poverty and Social Impact Study (PSIAs), a study to assess the impact of the planned macro-economic measures on the poor and to suggest alternatives or rehabilitative measures. Here the IMF violates its own PRSP policy, according to which all types of bi- and multilateral cooperation are to be under the PRSP. PRGFs are often treated as a separate process, outside the PRSP. A PRGF review is currently undertaken, and it must bring this practice to an end.</p>	<p>Like in the PRGF, every NIP contains macro-economic performance indicators, e.g. on public sector privatisation, on monetary policy, export targets and, most importantly, on balancing out the national budget in the course of time, mainly by budget and spending cuts. Continued EU support also depends on performance regarding these areas subject to the political dialogue between the EU Council, Commission and the particular country. On average, 32% of a national envelope are spent on macro-economic support. Unlike with the IMF and WB they are to a greater extent provided on a grant basis. Macro-economic strategies are part of the same document. Conditionality is subject to the political dialogue in the Committee of Ambassadors and the Council of Ministers.</p>

### Pro-Poor Growth

The PRSP see the anti-poverty impact of social policies on a par with macro-economic measures. This is a result of the resistance of Civil Society against the imposition of crude liberalisation policies. Pro-Poor Policy, for example, is the convergence of provision of inexpensive refinance resources for people in the agrarian sector, while at the same time having a growth-promoting and inflation-stifling monetary policy, or the traditional, sensitive connection of the informal and formal sector of the economy. Trade and industry policies can wipe out, for example, the livelihood of thousands of weavers, by lowering import duties or promoting mechanised textile mills (as it has happened in India). Pushing countries too hard to concentrate on export production of a few export commodities like coffee or cocoa, which depend heavily on the world market, makes countries more dependent and their debts and poverty growing. By contrast, a Pro-Poor Policy rather invests in economic diversification and a more diversified portfolio of export products, thus attaining a higher resilience to commodity price losses. The “Pro-Poor Growth” concept as of now lacks an empowerment agenda for the poor, combining redistribution and growth policies.

### Ownership and Participation

#### PRSP

There are a number of reasons why “country ownership” of the PRSPs cannot be easily achieved. It takes special efforts at country level. Governments are not enthusiastic about extensive national dialogue processes. Based on unstable democratic systems, they are considered politically risky and need time. The level of CS participation has in many cases been described as unsatisfactory by CS. It has proven more effective in a number of African countries when CS organises its own national poverty planning process and writes its own shadow or parallel PRS Paper. In Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda, more policy demands have been adopted from the CS parallel PRSP and integrated in the national PRSP in relation to countries where CS allowed itself to “participate” in a government-organised consultation process.

More than 60 Governments worked out a PRSP, and CS was at least informed. In about half of these countries CS was invited for debates of various depth. CS strategy recommendations were included in different ways in about 20 countries. In less than 10 countries CS receives Government funding for project implementation as a result of

#### Cotonou CSP/NIP

The institutional framework, the political dialogue and the planning process create more space for ownership of the ACP Governments themselves. But the form and intensity of a CS participation process depends entirely on the NAO and the head of the EU mission.

For CS, the CSP/NIP participation process appears as something separate from the PRSP. The EU-Cotonou Agreement is not generally known to have a participatory element for CS in planning and implementation in the ACP countries.

With few exceptions (Chad, Lesotho, Guinea, Swaziland), the CS participation in the programming exercise was by means of information.

About half of the NIPs mention CS's role in the implementation of poverty strategies. Broadly 5% of the national envelope is allocated for the utilisation in anti-poverty programmes of the CS. The Gender and Development Concept is present at the objective level. However, at the sector level it turns to the Women in Development Concept. Gender

<p>PRSP, though many PRSPs mention implementation as an important role of CS. On average the consultation has been more at the level of information sharing and debate, not at the level of common decision making.</p> <p>Regarding Gender, the poverty diagnostics do look at the situation of the women in the poor countries; however, they do not generally employ a Gender analysis. At policy level Gender features in the social safety net and the institutional reform. Gender monitoring is weak.</p>	<p>monitoring is weak.</p>
<p><b>Presently prevailing CS perception of PRSP and CSP/NIP</b></p>	
<p>African CS networks perceive the PRSPs as well as the CSP/NIPs as new names for the forced economic adaptation process known as Structural Adjustment. Due to greater public knowledge about the PRSP, this is more pronounced with the PRSP than the CSP/NIPs. The element of “forced incentives” towards achieving macro-economic targets, commonly known as “conditionality”, is strong in both approaches.</p> <p>CS generally dislikes getting involved in participation frameworks imposed upon them. However, CS feels compelled to qualify the anti-poverty strategy planning, which their Governments undertake as a condition for the receipt of ODA.</p> <p>The elements that are adopted from CS participation in the PRSP or the CSP/NIP normally are part of social sector strategies. Governments hardly ever have accepted macro-economic strategies from CS in the strategic documents. In general the adoption rate seems less in CSP/NIPs. Government bureaucracies and EU Delegations make it difficult for CS organisations to obtain funding for their anti poverty initiatives.</p> <p>However, both the PRSP as well as the CSP/NIP are long term strategic mechanisms of the donors. A long-term perspective is of great importance for CS organisation and participation. The Cotonou Agreement, building upon the CSP/NIP, has a 20-year perspective subject to 5 yearly revisions. The PRSPs are to be renewed subject to national planning cycles every three or five years.</p>	

**Session II:  
Civil Society Participation: Different Regional Approaches**

**The Cotonou Agreement and NSAs  
Dialogue at Policy and Implementation Level**

Pieter Bangma, European Commission

Sheet 1

**The role of the “Civil Society Liaison”**

- Contact point / facilitator / bridge with CS
- Promote dialogue between EC and CS
- Prepare, coordinate, follow-up of regular dialogue between Commissioner & Dev. NGOs
- Dialogue with CONCORD & its members
- Raise awareness inside Commission regarding input from CS (also critical feedback)
- Encourage colleagues to seek input from CS

Sheet 2

**Different levels of dialogue**

- Regular dialogue with Commissioner
- Issues/topics at unit level with colleagues directly responsible and dealing with the dossier
- Visits: formal and informal

Sheet 3

**The Cotonou Agreement: art. 6 - NSA examples**

- . Private sector
- . Economic & Social partners (incl. trade unions)
- . Civil society in all its forms according to national characteristics (e.g. associations of churches, universities, NGOs, grass roots organisations,...)

Sheet 4

**CS involvement in Government policy & implementation**

- . Dialogue in preparation of CSP & NIP/RIP
- . Dialogue on sectoral policy
- . Implementation
- . Review processes
- . And what about political dialogue?

Sheet 5

**Ensuring more effective development policy:  
The Commission's role**

- . Reinforced coordination with other donors, in particular EU Member States
- . Sensitization of relevant government authorities to involve all actors
- . Strengthen CS in development countries through a.o. provision of financial resources and capacity building support
  - Possible funds: **EDE**, **ECHO** & **thematic** budget lines
  - €1.4 bn out of €7 bn of EC's yearly ODA is managed by or with Civil Society Organisations.

Sheet 6

**The role of EC Delegations**

- (Deconcentration: to be completed by 2003)
- Ensuring and managing CS access to funding
- Ensure consistency between NGO (co-)financed projects and co-operation strategies with government
- Be involved in the selection process of (co-)financed projects
- Observer & Facilitator
  - Designation of a contact point for NGOs
  - Provide technical assistance to facilitate participation in programming & implementation
  - Undertake mapping studies

Sheet 7

**Role of European Civil Society**

- Awareness raising of dev. in enlarged Europe
- Promoting in-country dialogue processes (towards networking)
- Support for the preparation of a “NSA capacity building agenda” in partner countries
- Building NSA capacity in partner countries

Sheet 8

**The way ahead: implementing the policy**

- Draft guidelines for EC Delegations on CS involvement in dialogue and consultations:
  - To be discussed and shared with MS
  - Input from CS to be sought, via CONCORD
- Provide training for Delegation and HQ staff
- Incite MS to adopt similar principles and practices concerning CS involvement

**NSA direct involvement in programming:  
An introduction**

- . First time in 50 years EU cooperation
- . A start and a learning process
- . New approach with new partners, new modalities and new patterns of behaviour

**NSA direct involvement in programming:  
A first quantitative assessment (2003)**

- . Analysis of 63 CSPs
- . Consultations took place in 59 countries
- . 36 CSPs modified as a result of consultations
- . Funding earmarked for NSA in 39 country programmes
- . Follow-up arrangements for future consultation and monitoring in 43 countries

**NSA direct involvement in programming:  
Key questions on quality of consultation**

- . Timing and quality of information available for consultation
- . Selection of participants
- . Follow-up of consultations: feedback to CS

Sheet 12

**NSA direct involvement in programming:  
Challenges**

- . Improve information
- . Promote more dialogue
- . Better knowledge of representative orgs
- . Adopt adequate feedback mechanisms
- . Put in place monitoring system
- . Strengthen capacities of CS, Gov. & Delegation
- . Discuss role of Northern actors

Sheet 13

**CS direct involvement in programming:  
Conclusion & future**

- . Important efforts have been made by all parties
- . Quantitative outcome is encouraging
- . Lessons learned and best practices will feed future progress
- . CS to be involved in mid-term reviews: consultation continues and deepens

Sheet 14

**In short**  
**The Cotonou Process does strengthen Civil Society:**

- It is the start of an ongoing process
- Special for ACP (as against Asia & LA)
- It will contribute to more effective dev. aid

**Reality AND wishful thinking**

- It is a reality: the process is set in motion
- The process needs time and effort from ALL stakeholders

## **Session II:**

### **Civil Society Participation: Different Regional Approaches**

#### **How Do the Non-State Actors Participate under the New ACP-EU Partnership Agreement?**

**Consultation for Improving EU Development Aid.**

**Empirical Survey of 17 Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa**

**Rudolf Traub-Merz and Arne Schildberg, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation**

#### **Consultation of non-state actors under Cotonou**

- Political Dialogue
- Programming Development Aid
  - Country Support Strategy / National Indicative Programme (NIP)
  - Regional Support Strategy / Regional Indicative Programme (RIP)
- Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA)

## FES Country Survey: Focus on Programming of CSS/NIPs

**Table 1:**

### Country Strategy Papers (CSP)/Nat. Ind. Programmes (NIP) of Survey Countries

Countries	CSP / NIP Signed	CSP/NIP Unsigned as of 19.5.03	Consultation of Non-State actors
Cameroon	16.7.2001		yes
Mozambique	18.2.2002		yes
Mauritius	21.2.2002		yes
Ethiopia	27.2.2002		yes
Tanzania	8.3.2002		yes
Botswana	12.4.2002		yes
Uganda	30.5.2002		yes
Namibia	7.6.2002		yes
Ivory Coast	2.7.2002		yes
Zambia	11.7.2002		yes
Nigeria	16.7.2002		yes
Madagascar	18.7.2002		yes
Benin	9.10. 2002		yes
Ghana	22.10.2002		yes
Angola	28.1.2003		yes
Mali	Date unclear		yes
Kenya		Status unclear	yes
Senegal		Status unclear	yes
Zimbabwe		Blocked by EU	yes

Source: EU-website <http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/index> 19.5.2003; FES Country Survey 2002.

## **Assessing Consultation – Which Issues?**

- **Representation / Representativeness:**

Which groups were consulted?

- **Time factor:**

At what time of the decision-making process did consultation take place?

- **Form:**

In which form did consultation take place?

### **Not researched:**

Who did the selection of participants?

Was consultation Sex-/ Gender balanced?

How was consultation financed?

How did participants prepare for consultation?

What other ways were used to engage in public debate (media, talk-shows, etc.)?

**Table 2:**  
**Representation in Consultation according to Groups and Countries**

	<b>Trade Unions</b>	<b>Empl.Org. B.Chamber</b>	<b>Civ.Soc/ NGOs</b>	<b>Research Institutes</b>	<b>Loc.Gov. Assoc.</b>	<b>Total Points</b>
	(weight 0.2)	(weight 0.2)	(weight 0.4)	(weight 0.1)	(weight 0.1)	
Namibia	X	X	X	X	X	1
Ghana	X	X	X	X		0.9
Mauritius	X	X	X	X		0.9
Mozam.	X	X	X	X		0.9
Benin	X	X	X			0.8
Mali	X	X	X			0.8
Angola		X	X	X		0.7
Camero.		X	X	X		0.7
Tanzania		X	X	X		0.7
Botswana		X	X			0.6
Iv. Coast		X	X			0.6
Ethiopia	X	X (50%)	X <sup>2</sup> (50%)	X		0.6
Zambia		X	X			0.6
Senegal		X	X			0.6
Uganda		X	X			0.6
Madagas.		X (50%)	X (50%)	X (50%)		0.35
Kenya		X		X		0.3
<b>Average</b>	<b>41%</b>	<b>94%</b>	<b>88%</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>(0.69)</b>

Notes: <sup>1</sup> Data do not include Zimbabwe and Nigeria. Consultation in Zimbabwe was blocked half-way through by EU. Data on Nigeria were of unsatisfactory quality; <sup>2</sup> including NGOs set up by Government (GONGOS); <sup>3</sup> Ethiopia got deductions for leaving out Addis Ababa Chambers of Commerce and the Centre for Local Capacity Building – Madagascar got deductions for consulting only rural structures and only in the South.

**Table 3:**  
**The time factor in consultation**

	<b>Initial Phase</b>	<b>After first Draft</b>	<b>End-of-Process</b>	<b>All-through / 1<sup>st</sup> draft to end</b>	<b>Total Points</b>
	(weight: 1.0)	(weight: 1.0)	(weight: 0.5)	(weight: 2.0)	(max: 3.0)
Botswana	X	(X)	(X)	X	3
Ghana	X	(X)	(X)	X	3
Senegal	X	(X)	(X)	X	3
Kenya		(X)	(X)	X	2
Mauritius		(X)	(X)	X	2
Ivory Coast	X	X			2
Cameroon		X	X		1.5
Namibia		X	X		1.5
Angola		X			1
Madagas.		X			1
Mali		X			1
Mozamb.		X			1
Zambia		X			1
Tanzania		X			1
Uganda		X			1
Ethiopia			X		0.5
Benin			X		0.5

Notes: <sup>1</sup>All-through includes 'first draft' and 'end-of-process'. (x) in table means: no double-counting.

**Table 4:**  
**Form of consultation**

	<b>Passive/ Info. only</b>	<b>Written Input</b>	<b>Oral Dialogue</b>	<b>Committee/ Institution</b>	<b>Total Points</b>
	(weight 0.5)	(weight 1.0)	(weight 1.0)	(weight 2.0)	(max : 3.0)
Ghana <sup>1</sup>			X	X <sup>2</sup>	3
Mauritius		X	(X)	X	3
Namibia			X	X <sup>3</sup>	3
Cameroon <sup>5</sup>	X	X	X		2.5
Kenya			(X)	X <sup>4</sup>	2
Senegal			(X)	X	2
Tanzania		X	X		2
Botswana	X		X		1.5
Angola			X		1
Ivory Coast			X		1
Ethiopia			X		1
Madagascar			X		1
Mali			X		1
Mozamb.			X		1
Zambia			X		1
Uganda			X		1
Benin	X				0.5

Notes: <sup>1</sup>Committee is inclusive of oral dialogue but exclusive of written input. (x) in table means: no double-counting. Ghana and Namibia have double-track consultation with committee plus additional conference with other participants; <sup>2</sup> Ghana: inter-institutional committee on multilateral trade negotiations-subcommittee on ACP-EU negotiations with membership for TWN-Africa and Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC); <sup>3</sup> Namibia: Task Team on EPA in Ministry of Trade & Industry; <sup>4</sup> Kenya: National Committee on Cotonou Agreement; <sup>5</sup> Cameroon invited NGOs for a briefing and written proposals, and only GICAM for dialogue;

**The over-all index on Quality of Consultation**

- 1. Quality = Representation x (Time + Form)
- Alternative: Quality = Representation x Time x Form
- Quality = Representation<sup>2</sup> x Time x Form

**2. Construction of Quality Standards**

Class/Standard	Overall Points	Representation	Time	Form
High	4.8 – 6.0	0.8 – 1.0	3.0	3.0
Satisfactory	2.8 – 4.7	0.7	2.0 – 2.5	2.0 – 2.5
Minimum	1.2 – 2.7	0.6	1.0 – 1.5	1.0 – 1.5
Disqualified	<1.2 or single factor disqualified	< 0.6	0.5	0.5
		Trade U.: 0.2	Init.Phase: 1.0	Info.Only: 0.5
		Employers: 0.2	After 1.Draft: 1.0	Written F.: 1.0
		Civil Soc.: 0.4	End-Process: 0.5	Oral D.: 1.0
		Res.Instit.: 0.1	All through: 2.0	Committee: 2.0
		Loc.Gov.: 0.1		

**Table 6:****Quality of consultation**

(Quality = Representation (Time + Form))

	<b>Index Quality</b> (max3.0)	<b>Quality Class</b>	<b>Freedom House democracy index<sup>1</sup> 2001-02</b>	<b>Representation</b> (max: 1.0)	<b>Time</b> (max 3.0)	<b>Form</b> (max 3.0)
Ghana	5.4	High	2.3 (free)	0.9	3	3
Mauritius	4.5	Satisfactory	1.2 (free)	0.9	2	3
Namibia	4.5	Satisfactory	2.3 (free)	1	1.5	3
Senegal	3	Satisfactory	3.4 (part free)	0.6	3	2
Cameroon	2.8	Satisfactory	6.6 (not free)	0.7	1.5	2.5
Botswana	2.7	Minimum	2.2 (free)	0.6	3	1.5
Tanzania	2.1	Minimum	4.4 (part free)	0.7	1	2
Ivory Coast	1.8	Minimum	5.4 (part free)	0.6	2	1
Mozamb	1.8	Minimum	3.4 (part free)	0.9	1	1
Mali	1.6	Minimum	2.3 (free)	0.8	1	1
Angola	1.4	Minimum	6.6 (not free)	0.7	1	1
Zambia	1.2	Minimum	5.4 (part free)	0.6	1	1
Uganda	1.2	Minimum	6.5 (not free)	0.6	1	1
Kenya	1.2	Disqualified	6.5 (not free)	0.3	2	2
Ethiopia	0.9	Disqualified	5.5 (part free)	0.6	0.5	1
Benin	0.8	Disqualified	2.3 (free)	0.8	0.5	0.5
Madagas.	0.7	Disqualified	2.4 (free)	0.35	1	1
<b>All Average</b>	<b>37% (2.21)</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>4.04</b>	<b>69% (0.69)</b>	<b>51% (1.53)</b>	<b>54% (1.62)</b>

Notes: <sup>1</sup>The Freedom House index uses the following 'borderlines': Free 1.0-2.5; partly free 3.0-5.5; not free 6-7.

**Table 7:**  
**Discrepancies in consultation according to regions**

	<b>Index Quality (max3.0)</b>	<b>Quality Class</b>	<b>Freedom House democracy index1 2001-02</b>	<b>Representation (max: 1.0)</b>	<b>Time (max 3.0)</b>	<b>Form (max 3.0)</b>
Ghana	5.4	High	2.3 (free)	0.9	3	3
Mauritius	4.5	Satisfactory	1.2 (free)	0.9	2	3
Namibia	4.5	Satisfactory	2.3 (free)	1	1.5	3
Senegal	3	Satisfactory	3.4 (part free)	0.6	3	2
Cameroon	2.8	Satisfactory	6.6 (not free)	0.7	1.5	2.5
Botswana	2.7	Minimum	2.2 (free)	0.6	3	1.5
Tanzania	2.1	Minimum	4.4 (part free)	0.7	1	2
Ivory Coast	1.8	Minimum	5.4 (part free)	0,6	2	1
Mozambique	1.8	Minimum	3.4 (part free)	0.9	1	1
Mali	1.6	Minimum	2.3 (free)	0.8	1	1
Angola	1.4	Minimum	6.6 (not free)	0.7	1	1
Zambia	1.2	Minimum	5.4 (part free)	0.6	1	1
Uganda	1.2	Minimum	6.5 (not free)	0.6	1	1
Kenya	1.2	Disqualified	6.5 (not free)	0.3	2	2
Ethiopia	0.9	Disqualified	5.5 (part free)	0.6	0.5	1
Benin	0.8	Disqualified	2.3 (free)	0.8	0.5	0.5
Madagas.	0.7	Disqualified	2.4 (free)	0.35	1	1
<b>All Average</b>	<b>37% (2.21)</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>4.04</b>	<b>69% (0.69)</b>	<b>51% (1.53)</b>	<b>54% (1.62)</b>

## Summary / Conclusion

### ➤ **Consultation beyond mere rhetoric:**

All countries invited one sort of non-state actor or the other for consultation. Central governments have accepted that ACP-EU relations will not remain an exclusive resort for state players.

### ➤ **Improved consultation at all researched levels:**

#### **- Representation:**

Involve Loc.Gov., Trade Unions, Research Inst.  
Widen sectoral composition  
(trade/manufacturing/employment)  
Develop concept for plurality representation (rival org.)

#### **- Time factor / Form:**

Early briefing session and context setting  
Segmentation only with re-assembling  
Promote internal consultation with constituency  
Promote written proposals  
Promote use of / access to external expertise  
Promote double-track consultation: standing committees + public hearings

### ➤ **Additional Recommendations**

- Compile fact sheet (updated) on non-state actors (actor mapping)
- Make coming consultation rounds public
- Document all phases of consultation process
- Monitor org. impact of capacity building (avoid splinter effects)
- No consultation without feed-back

## **Session II: Civil Society Participation: Different Regional Approaches**

### **Cotonou – A Southern Perspective**

**Rebecca Muna, Tanzania Networking Programme**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

Tanzania has been a beneficiary of European Commission (EC) development assistance since the start of the Lomé I Convention in 1975. As a member of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group it is a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020) signed on 23 June 2000 in Cotonou, Benin.

Over the past 25 years, EU-Tanzania cooperation has seen a gradual narrowing of the focus. Initially covering agriculture and rural development, transport and social development during Lomé I to III, a strong focus was put on the road sector with a secondary emphasis on the social services and infrastructure for the second part of Lomé IV.

Since the start of Lomé IV, and in addition to the National Indicative Programme (NIP), there have been allocations from the Structural Adjustment Facility for stabilising and strengthening the macro-economic framework.

Other support has been in the area of emergency support for food aid, refugees and HIV/AIDS as well as support provided through micro-projects in a number of areas outside those mentioned above.

It is stated that under the 9<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF) 355 m euros are earmarked for:

- Transport Infrastructure (roads) (40%),
- Macro-economic support (30%)
- Basic education (15%),
- Governance (10%),
- Water and
- Agriculture (STABEX funded)

One of the fundamental principles of cooperation within the Cotonou Agreement is participation, which means the "integration of all sections of society, including the private sector and civil society organisations, into the mainstream of political, economic and social life" (Cotonou Agreement, Article 2). The actors of cooperation include non-state actors, i.e. the Agreement's objective is to make EU-ACP cooperation decentralised and transparent: Decisions should be broadly based to achieve wide ownership.

The Tanzania government has also embarked explicitly on this objective and stated its commitment to participation in the Poverty Reduction Strategy, the Country Support Strategy, the National Trade Policy and the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy.

## **NON-STATE ACTORS (NSAs) PARTICIPATION IN THE ACP - EU AGREEMENT**

The NSA definition given in the Cotonou Agreement provides only a superficial description of the term NSAs by splitting them into three groups:

- Private sector (profit organisations),
- Economic and social partners (e.g. trade unions, farmers associations)
- Civil society in all its forms (non-profit organisations)

Instead of clarifying things, the categories hold the potential for conflict. In many countries the NSAs insist on a distinction between profit and non-profit organisations. Over and above that, organisations wish the term Civil Society to be specified, as in the case of Zimbabwe alone it was found that 22 different sector formations form part of the NSAs.

### **What are the criteria for NSAs involvement?**

According to the Cotonou Agreement the involvement of NSAs is furthermore based on three criteria, ranging from:

- Specific competencies
- The need the organisations address
- The organisational form, which is to be transparent and democratic.

### **But who defines them? Who assesses the qualifications?**

To secure an objective application of the criteria in each country and increase the transparency, NSAs should exploit their scope of action and draw up their own criteria, as done in Zimbabwe.

### **What is the scope of NSAs' involvement?**

The guidelines describing the opportunities and extent of NSAs' involvement in the ACP-EU cooperation remain vague. Each country is given the opportunity to exploit and expand the scope of action inherent in the provisions and create its own participatory forums.

The provisions made for the NSAs' participation in the Cotonou Agreement and their inherent scope of action are to be interpreted by the NSAs themselves, as they are only permissive and not prescriptive.

It is therefore up to the NSAs to clearly define their interests, articulate them in proposals and insist on:

- Involvement in the policy processes, such as the regular reviews of the CSS, the engagement in the trade policy debate, the programme implementation and
- Access to financial support from the EU.

So far the Tanzanian CSS only provides 2% of the overall envelope for NSAs, whereas the ACP countries on average spent 5% margin.

### **Extent of NSAs involvement in Tanzania**

The EU Delegates' and the Tanzanian Government's perception of the state of Non-State Actors' (NSAs) involvement in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement is as follows:

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as implementing agencies at project level **have** existed since 1975-76, the concept of extending the partnership to a broad range of NSAs, as outlined in the Cotonou Agreement, is an innovation also for the governments. Nevertheless, the EU Delegation and the National Authorising Officer (NAO) have started to involve NSAs more “systematically” since September 2000.

- Subsequent to the launching of the general Cotonou Agreement at Karimjee Hall, it became more obvious that out of the three pillars – aid, trade and political dialogue – determining the ACP-EU partnership, it is mainly the aid component which provides space for NSAs participation in Tanzania.

According to the EU Delegates and the Government, NSAs have been highly involved in various processes related to the implementation of the European-Tanzanian development cooperation, ranging from the design of national development strategies to the implementation of programmes listed in the national Country Support Strategy. Thus, confronting the opportunities for NSAs' participation defined in the Cotonou Agreement with the actual initiatives taken in Tanzania, is shown in the following:

<b>Opportunities for NSAs' involvement according to the Cotonou Agreement</b>	<b>NSAs' involvement in Tanzania promoted by the EU Delegation and the NAO</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dissemination of information</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Launching of the Cotonou Agreement held in January 2001 in Karimjee Hall, in Dar es salaam, Tanzania, the regular publishing of the EU newsletter, the compilation of a brochure on the education programme etc.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consultation on cooperation policies and strategies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Involvement in the preparation process of the Country Support Strategy and in the forthcoming annual operational review</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provision with financial resources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A specific amount of money was set aside – on request of the Tanzanian Government – for the promotion of NSAs.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity building</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• District Capacity Building Programme in the non-focal sector of Good Governance is in the planning</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Involvement in the implementation of cooperation projects and programmes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The extent of involvement depends on the design of the respective programme and project</li> </ul>

However, there is a general recognition that there is still need for improvement, and the participants were invited to get into deeper discussion with the EU on how to involve NSAs more effectively. The delegates encouraged the NSAs to identify their specific interests and to approach the EU to exchange their opinions and proposals on a sector-by-sector basis.

**Is it involvement or participation or consultation? ..... who defines it? What does it mean?**

**Who cares about quality and value added into the processes as a result of NSA participation?**

While the fundamental role of NSAs is clearly stated in the Cotonou Agreement, the NSA participation/involvement still only exists on paper.

There is contradiction in conceptualising what it means when it comes to involvement or participation of NSAs. While the Government and the EU Delegates are saying that NSAs are highly involved in different policy processes, the NSAs are saying that the level of involvement is invisible.

NSAs demand full participation in the process of policy formulation for negotiations, programming and implementation, but the Government and the EU Delegates are limiting the participation to mere consultation in few workshops.

Evidence was given by a study<sup>3[1]</sup> done on the monitoring of NSA participation in the preparation of CSS. Some of the factors that limited NSA participation in the CSS process, as pointed out in the study, include:

- Low level of information and awareness;
- Lack of capacity;
- Lack of co-ordination;
- Low level of representation;
- Lack of funds and information on how to access funds
- Lack of transparency on the side of the EU and the NAO

A number of recommendations emerged from the study as regards effective participation of NSAs and dialogue in different processes under the ACP/EU Cotonou Agreement:

### **EU and Tanzanian Government**

- The Government/EU Delegates need to foster public awareness/sensitisation of ACP/EU issues and the Cotonou Agreement at all levels, and this could be done by information dissemination to NGOs. There is a need to produce user-friendly materials that are translated into the national language (Swahili). There is also a

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<sup>3[1]</sup>This is documented in: “*Civil Society Participation in the ACP-EU CSS process in Tanzania: A Civil Society Perspective*”, TCDD/TASOET in collaboration with EuroStep, Rebecca Muna

need to conduct sensitisation seminars for CSOs to engage in the processes (CSS, NIP).

- All documents/information relating to future processes involving civil society should be sent out to civil society organisations in good time to give room for critical analysis and quality input into the processes.
- The level of transparency regarding consultation processes needs to be improved by the Government/EU Delegates through the disclosure of figures and facts needed by CSOs for their analysis. There should also be greater disclosure to the public of the implementation of policies and programmes relating to the Cotonou Agreement, both by the Government and the EU decision-makers. This should cover proposals made in all phases of programming.
- CSO networks or coalitions should be involved in the process of selecting representatives of CSOs for the different meetings, seminars, round table discussions or any form of consultation with governments.
- Government representatives/EU Delegates should attend and participate (whenever invited to speak) in different meetings, workshops, and discussions organised by the CSOs.

### **Civil Society Organisations**

- A National Civil Society platform which would lead in the process of bridging the information gap within the grassroots/community-based network organisations needs to be set up. At the same time it should take steps to further broaden the participation and representation of both urban and rural-based organisations. The idea of CSOs working together should not simply be seen as a concept, but a strategy, to create or build a movement that can benefit the country.
- Civil Society Organisations need to improve the ways they feedback and share information amongst themselves within national platforms, local networks, regional focal points and the ACP Civil Society Forum.
- CSOs need to cultivate relations with the Government, the EU Delegates and other social interest groups, with a view to sharing ideas and perspectives on how to achieve poverty reduction.
- CSOs should do more serious, independent analytical work on policy issues. The results should be used to inform the public, NGOs at all levels, ACP/Government and the EU of Cotonou Agreement policy implications.
- CSOs should spare time to learn and understand macro-level issues related to poverty reduction initiatives and strategies. These could include issues in the Cotonou Agreement, World Bank/IMF policies, and other issue related to bilateral initiatives.

### **Linkages:**

#### **National level**

- National CSOs forums on Cotonou

In Tanzania's case, as a strategy to build a national forum<sup>4[2]</sup> that brings together non-state actors at national level, a number of workshops were held to conceptualise and build consensus on how to get involved.

- A Cotonou- NSA Steering Committee was formed this year to define an action plan on Cotonou issues and identify a way to integrate more relevant non-state stakeholders into the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement;

To think about NSA self-organisation: The steering committee would identify a way of how to ensure the involvement of various relevant stakeholders (e.g. farmers, fish workers, food processors etc.), to be accountable to the stakeholders and operate on the basis of transparent guidelines

Collect information on Cotonou: to help to define the NSA groups' interests and design a strategy.

To think about how to create a dialogue with the government: e.g. NAO, EU Delegates. The Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of Finance, Board of External Trade, the Trade Committee in Parliament, the joint ACP-EU Parliamentary representatives etc.

### **Sub-regional level**

- Focal points for ACP-EU Cotonou issues at sub-regional level

In the case of East Africa, the focal point is Econews Africa. A number of initiatives were implemented at this level, just to mention one: There is strategic move to build capacity for carrying out issues and create awareness within the sub-regional. To this end, Econews Africa, in collaboration with Friedrich Ebert Foundation (in 3 countries of East Africa), organised three-module consultancy training seminars to build resource persons bank for the sub regional.

### **Regional Level**

- Civil Society Forum

This forum brings together NSAs from Africa to engage at ACP EU level, preparing positions from the region and critically contribute to the negotiation processes.

### **CONCLUSION**

Even though the opportunities might be clearer now, there are still a number of other problems, which can function as bottlenecks and prevent NSAs from participating. The problems to be addressed are, for instance:

- The size of the NSAs' groupings seeking involvement. The EU generally prefers to support bigger groups as the processing of proposals is very time consuming and involves a lot of administration.

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<sup>4[2][2]</sup> The process was slow because of a lack of capacity, information and inadequate interest of NSA to get involved in Cotonou Agreement issues.

- The right preparation for and the fitting into the established inter-governmental dialogue arrangements or
- The complexity and lack of transparency of the EU procedures

The nature of NSAs' involvement should be changed, moving beyond mere consultation in the workshops to involving CSOs in the different technical working groups that prepare programme and strategy papers.

NSAs' capacity building for effective participation in different dialogues and consultation should involve, amongst others:

- a. The establishment of clear procedures for CSO access to resources;
- b. The encouragement of CSOs in the ACP and the EU to carry out research and studies to enhance their capacity for dialogue;
- c. The training of CSOs in various fields, such as economic literacy

### **But how can NSAs organise themselves to work together and have a tangible impact?**

Against the background of the above arguments, NSAs will achieve the most by cooperating, coordinating and pooling their knowledge. Good preparation is essential and starts with some preliminary decisions:

Clarify and apply the principles of:

- Transparency
- Inclusiveness
- Being representative
- Accountability
- Be clear on the objectives of each organisation involved (is it finance, sector-based policy dialogue, trade policy etc.?)
- Be clear on the current realities and obstacles to be faced
- Do a rigorous cost/benefit analysis.



## **Session II: Civil Society Participation: Different Regional Approaches**

### **Conclusions from the Regional Approaches**

**Karine Sohet, Aprodev**

#### **Introduction**

Judging from the different presentations it is quite clear that the new policy regarding civil society participation in the Cotonou Agreement represents a major achievement. It is also important to note that such binding political principles do not exist in any other cooperation between the EU and developing countries (Asia, Latin America, Meda). The Council and the Parliament both recognised this fact and recommended in their conclusions on the NSA communication that the Cotonou provisions on NSA should be extended to other cooperation agreements.

The speakers also showed that, due to the good policy principles enshrined in the Cotonou agreement, progress has been made to consult civil society in the framework of the CSS programming.

However, where the approach of NSA participation is good in theory, even now we still observe many difficulties and only limited success in practice. There are many shortcomings explaining these bad results, and one could question the reality of the political will at the level of the EU and ACP governments to really involve CS. Furthermore, when participation is taken seriously, the emphasis and focus is on aid and programming, while trade and policy dialogue, which are equally important, are completely out of the scope of the consultation and participation processes.

In practice we observe a clear lack of ownership and integration by EC staff of this new approach in their development and cooperation activities. It can be explained by a lack of awareness and training and by the incoherence of signals received from the EC headquarters. Guidelines have not been finished yet and are being prepared by different units in different DGs (DG Development, Aidco, DG Trade, ISQG). Guidelines on the mid-term review do not really integrate that dimension of consultation, but no link seems to be envisaged with the specific guidelines on consultation prepared in parallel by DG Dev B1.

If a real qualitative improvement is to be expected from civil society participation, the whole process should be owned and civil society should be in the driver's seat. CS actors should not expect too much from delegations and governments but should organise themselves independently to make their voices heard. Monitoring the quality of participation is clearly a task where CS should give a major input. The role of delegations is clearly limited to facilitating the dialogue and to observing and monitoring the process. Regarding the deconcentration process it is clear, however, that delegations will have a strong role in making the participation at implementation level work properly.

The challenge for Northern NGOs: Are we prepared to assist Southern partners in developing their own strategies and structures and to strengthen capacity and expertise, making sure that

we do not substitute Southern counterparts? What do we include in the capacity building role that the EC would like us to play?

The challenge for Southern NGOs is the need to organise themselves into platforms and other coordination structures which are representative and allow participation.

The lack of mapping of NSAs and civil society in each country is a major obstacle to better organised consultation and to a real understanding of the civil society context of each country. The creation of multi-stakeholders committees (NSA – Government – delegation) to discuss the modalities and ways to put the NSA policy into practice seems to be a possible way forward (the FES study shows that participation in programming was better when standing committees pre-existed). Such committees could also organise and commission the mapping studies.

In order to support the role of NGOs (South and North) in making sure that effective and qualitative civil society participation is taking place, more adequate support instruments are needed. With regard to funding, a more flexible approach is needed which allows small-scale and grassroots organisations to benefit from financial resources. Until now the EC has been concentrating on producing guidelines for consultation in the programming process, but we still miss the modalities for direct funding of Southern organisations to support their activities and their participation in the NIPs.

## **Conclusions of the VENRO Workshop: Reality or Wishful Thinking – Does the Cotonou Process Strengthen Civil Society?**

**Dr. Hildegard Hagemann, German Commission for Justice and Peace**

It is challenging to draw conclusions from a day full of information and complex discussions, especially when the speakers themselves gave conclusions and recommendations on their specific topics in an expert way. However, I will agree with the famous German comedian - Karl Valentin - who suggested that everything has been said but not yet by everybody! This may give me the right to approach today's theme from yet another angle, not without referring to the contributions of the experts.

Preparing myself for this workshop I listed my questions and concerns. I might not have got all the answers I needed. However, I got a lot of information and thoughts on viewpoints, definitions, criteria, structures and realities to take home to my institution and partners in development cooperation. And I'd be delighted if you agreed with me that this is an outcome of this workshop.

Reflecting the reason why participation seems to be a magic formula in development processes we have to realise that in almost 50 years of development cooperation it has become clear that the sustainable fight against poverty can only be won by involving the poor themselves. Poverty reduction has become a target which the international community not only signed in the Millennium Development Goals. We heard Mrs Rusteberg in her introduction speech this morning quoting the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Mr Paul Nielson, on the importance of participation for poverty reduction by the Cotonou Agreement. However, we also learnt from Mrs Sohet that unfortunately in other EU agreements, for example the ALA, this priority is missing.

Nevertheless, the self-aid potential of poor people all over the world and in the ACP countries is existent and reliable. They themselves are able to increase their living-standards if they get the chance not only to voice what they want, but also to participate in decision making and the implementation of programs. Therefore, participation is more than informing the population, it is even more than consulting target groups at one stage of the process or the other – it is working with the decisions of stakeholders and empowering them not only verbally but practically.

However, there seem to be several obstacles concerning the quality of participation and the availability and flow of information, which was so evidently shown in the presentations by Mr Traub and Mrs Muna. Participation uses different instruments and methods in different societies and can even endanger and undermine existing democratic structures of political participation (for example parliaments). On the other hand, information to prepare decisions by civil society is often not rendered sufficiently. Confusion is the result stemming mainly from the international donor community, who want to implement different programs for different reasons, suggesting the same purpose – poverty reduction. There must be more critical assessments of such Northern influence.

More research is necessary in cooperation, preferably with local research capacities. And more comparison is necessary, as was shown by Mr Lanzet's compilation of different development processes, like PRSPs and CSPs. Participation of civil society in formulating the papers might be even more successful and sustainable when it is not understood as an involvement in pre-structured processes, but as an independently formulated civil society contribution which has to be taken into serious account while shaping the governmental programs. So it was obvious that the PRSPs are more advanced in their forecast of social impact, while the CSP are more focused on trade. They both show the same weaknesses only in the Gender sensitivity. Certainly you have to look beyond the parish pump to learn and improve your own strategies and instruments for participation and poverty reduction.

When you promote participation you cannot easily stop at certain fields or issues. It must be implemented, institutionalised in the best possible way for conflict resolution as well as poverty reduction, on trade issues at regional and national as well as global level. It sets off a dynamic process which cannot be turned on and off as you like. Also, civil society is not as constant as it might seem. Needs of societies are different and changing. For example, trade unions represent the formal economy, but what about a country where the informal economy is getting bigger? How do you take account of the opinion of the masses of people working informally? When civil society is asked to participate in programme setting etc., one has to allow time for proper constitutionalising, information, reflection, expression and feedback. Participation has to be incited, fostered and trained, but must not be pushed through because donors want their programs running.

This brings me back to our dealing with participation as a formula for poverty reduction. Even when we produce masses of papers with well-written concepts setting out why this or that formula has to work, we basically rely on the comprehension of the individual. This was demonstrated very well by Mr Bangma's presentation of the organisational chart of his Directorate and his position in it. Behind every title there is a human being who has to be convinced of what he/she is doing. And Mr Stocker showed the complex and sophisticated structures of the EU and ACP relationship. Joint Council of Ministers, EU Commission, Joint Parliamentarian assembly, ACP Secretariat, Economic and Social Committee, Non-State Actors, – decision level, working level... all these are humans with their own opinions. My conclusion is to point out the dire necessity of mainstreaming the idea of poverty reduction by participation also in our own institutions and structures. I'd like to emphasise that I not only refer to state-related structures but also to non-state structures. Mrs Schmid agreed with the observation that it takes time to mainstream certain ideas, even in institutions which are dedicated to the cause of development like the BMZ.

Also as NSA or CSO or NGO – however you may categorise civil society – we have to be self-critical in reviewing our participatory approach and our pursuit of the aim of poverty reduction. We cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that there is misuse of legitimacy. We need instruments to control the distributions of resources to civil society actors, but at the same time enough flexibility to serve the multitude of forms of civil society in our partner countries.

Let me sum up the recommendations of the workshop that we have to improve the cooperation, the flow of information, the accountability, the transparency within and between our structures (i.e. up and down - from EU-NSA national governments), and improve in a

parallel way the same with regard to our direct partners in the ACP countries. If this is achieved, participation can strengthen civil society in a way which helps to eradicate poverty.

I saw the willingness for dialogue today among the participants and therefore dare to forecast a chance for participation in the coming Mid-term Review. We have many opportunities to practise and improve our dialogue and cooperation. And we have the stated political will to reduce poverty by participation of civil societies of what will soon be 25 EU and 79 ACP states, which is more than half of the world's nations!



**The following VENRO Working Papers have been published up to now:**

**Arbeitspapier Nr. 1: Arbeitspapier zur Zukunft der EU-AKP-Zusammenarbeit**  
VENRO-Positionspapier zur Zukunft des Lomé-Abkommens vom 13. Februar 1998

**Arbeitspapier Nr. 2: Der Internationale Währungsfonds – neuer Akteur in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit?**

Dokumentation des VENRO-Studientages am 13. Januar 1998

**Arbeitspapier Nr. 3: Initiatoren, Wächter oder ungebetene Gäste? Die Rolle von NRO beim Aufbau einer Global-Governance-Architektur**

Dokumentation der Fachtagung am 29. Oktober 1998

**Arbeitspapier Nr. 4: Handel statt Hilfe? Das Lomé-Abkommen vor dem Umbruch**

Dokumentation des VENRO-Studientages am 4. November 1998

**Arbeitspapier Nr. 5: Der neue Lomé-Vertrag – Welche Rolle für die NRO?**

Dokumentation des Studientages am 14. Februar 1998

**Arbeitspapier Nr. 6: Schuldenkrise vor der Lösung? Die deutsche Schuldeninitiative für den G8-Gipfel: Werden die Schulden der ärmsten nun auf ein tragbares Maß reduziert?**

Dokumentation des VENRO-Studientages am 17. März 1999

**Arbeitspapier Nr. 7: VENRO-Kampagne „Deutsche EU-Präsidentschaft“**

Textsammlung zur Kampagne im ersten Halbjahr 1999, Juni 1999

**Arbeitspapier Nr. 8: Nachhaltigkeit in der Humanitären Hilfe**

Diskussionspapier im Rahmen des Projekts „Qualität in der Humanitären Hilfe“ (deutsch/englisch), September 1999

**Arbeitspapier Nr. 9: Die Reform der EU-Entwicklungspolitik: Aufbruch oder Abbruch?**

Dokumentation zum VENRO-Studientag am 18. September 2000, Bonn

**Arbeitspapier Nr. 10: Globales Lernen als Aufgabe und Handlungsfeld entwicklungspolitischer Nichtregierungsorganisationen**

Grundsätze, Probleme und Perspektiven der Bildungsarbeit des VENRO und seiner Mitgliedsorganisationen, Dezember 2000, Bonn

**Arbeitspapier Nr. 11: Den ärmsten Ländern neue Chancen eröffnen!**

NRO-Beiträge zur UN LDC III Konferenz vom 14.-20. Mai 2001 in Brüssel

**Arbeitspapier Nr. 12: Entwicklung ohne Ausgrenzung: Menschen mit Behinderung als entwicklungspolitisches Querschnittsthema im Kontext der Menschenrechte**

Dokumentation der internationalen Fachtagung am 8. Mai 2002 in Berlin, Juli 2002